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Abstract 
Using the NYPD Complaint Data, this study compares the frequency of nine quality of life 
(QOL) misdemeanor complaints (n = 196,577) in New York City (NYC) before (n = 108,382) 
and after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform Act (n = 88,195), which eliminated cash bail for most 
misdemeanor crimes. The results show an overall decrease (18.6%) in nine QOL misdemeanor 
complaints in NYC after bail reform with a large effect (d = 1.317).  The main limitation of this 
study is that it did not control for the impact of COVID-19 in 2020 on the criminal justice 
system’s shifting priorities. Another limitation is that it did not control for NYC residents 
spending more time at home during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Future research should 
examine repeat offenders who are released before trial and the nexus between misdemeanors and 
violent crime. 
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In 2018, concerned with pretrial detention and overcrowded jails, New York State (NYS) 
Governor Andrew M. Cuomo proposed a progressive set of reforms to repair NYS’s criminal 
justice system. Part of the proposed reforms was reducing the use of cash bail and pretrial 
detention to reshape NYS’s “antiquated bail system” by eliminating cash bail for misdemeanor 
crimes (NYS Government, 2018, para. 2). The 2019 NYS Bail Reform Act was passed as part of 
the New York State Fiscal Year (SFY) Budget for 2019–2020 and became effective on January 
1, 2020. 
While some New York City (NYC) residents favored the bail reform, others resented it. 
The prevalent beliefs were that proposed bail reform endangers communities, allows for more 
quality of life (QOL) misdemeanor crimes, and accepts that alleged offenders would be released 
back to the neighborhoods during their court processing and subsequently commit additional 
crimes. Even NYC Mayor Bill De Blasio (2014-present) was stating that “there’s a direct 
correlation to the change in the law” while presenting NYC statistics on the number of “suspects 
freed under new bail reform …. going to commit major crimes” (Parascandola & Greene, 2020, 
para. 4). New York Police Department (NYPD) started releasing figures that showed a spike in 
crime, and they correlated that spike to the elimination of cash bail for misdemeanor offenses 
(Shea, 2020, para.3). Furthermore, the anti-bail reform advocates were ostracized in the media by 
progressives and criticized by criminal law experts from various universities and colleges in New 
York for misleading and alarmist coverage (Bader et al., 2020, para. 2). 
Despite this topic’s relevance in contemporary society, anti-reform views and public 
safety concerns are hardly new. In 1966, there was an outcry over the first Bail Reform Act of 
1966 that, along with other provisions, provided a statutory right for non-capital defendants to 
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pretrial release and a release on recognizance (ROR) (Fair Treatment for Indigent, 2011, p. 12). 
However, public concerns regarding increased crime and violence forced the United States 
(U.S.) Congress to enact a second Bail Reform Act of 1984 allowing judges to fully or 
temporarily detain defendants before trials on the grounds of dangerousness to the public. 
Back in 1970, President Richard Nixon urged the U.S. Congress to pass the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act1 that funded almost US$100 million of federal 
money into federal, state, and local law enforcement to invigorate the criminal justice system 
(Thompson, 2014, p. 64). By the 1990s, the NYPD started placing a “successful emphasis on 
suppressing public open-air drug markets” and adopted new policing tactics (Latzer, 2016, para. 
28). Along with the introduction of new anti-drug tactics, the NYPD implemented the Broken 
Windows Theory (BWT) to combat crime. BWT suggests that anti-social behavior and civil 
disorder form an environment that fosters QOL offenses, including violent crimes (Kelling & 
Wilson, 1982, para. 11). Proposed as a form of community-oriented policing, the BWT offered 
an attentive approach to combat QOL crimes, which aimed to decrease violence (Bratton, 2015, 
p.1). 
The implementation of new law enforcement tactics had collateral consequences, such as 
high incarceration rates and taxpayers’ burdens to build and maintain prisons. While some 
support using BWT for policing, others argue against it. Opponents of BWT see it as an 
aggressive “quota-driven practice” that “[h]urts and severely compromises the lives and well-
being of people and communities” (Police Reforms Organizing Project, 2012, p. 1) as it focuses 
on a variety of misdemeanor offenses. For example, in New York State (NYS), QOL offenses 
include petit larceny (stealing the property of another person) and making graffiti (intentionally 
 
1 The Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, §4 Stat 1236 (1971) 
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damaging property of another person) and are both considered Class A misdemeanors (NYS 
Penal Law, 2020, S 155.25; S 146.60). Notably, in 2017, misdemeanor arrest rates were 1,345 
per 100,000 residents aged 16-65 in New York City (NYC); however, in NYS, the rates were 
2,290 per 100,000 residents aged 16-65 (Patten et al., 2018, p.23). Thus, in cases of low-level 
offenses, judges determine whether to detain or release the defendant on a surety bond. This bail 
bond is a sum of money that guarantees the defendant’s court appearance on the day of trial. 
The purpose of this study is to objectively determine whether the total number of QOL 
misdemeanor complaints in New York City increased after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform Act 
promulgation. Specifically, this study will compare the frequency of nine QOL misdemeanor 
complaints before and after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform. The misdemeanors of this study include 
but are not limited to aggravated harassment in the second degree, assault in the third degree, 
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, making graffiti, criminal 
mischief in the fourth degree, petit larceny (from the open area), menacing in the second degree, 
sexual abuse in the second degree, and criminal trespass in the second degree (New York State 
Penal Law, 2020; see Table 1). Due to the limitations of existing incident-level research 
following the 2019 NYS Bail Reform, this study seeks to contribute to the body of knowledge on 
the 2019 NYS Bail Reform and provide implications for quality-of-life offenses in New York 
City. 
The study will address three research questions and three hypotheses: 
RQ1: Is there any change in individual frequency among the nine quality of life 
misdemeanor complaints subject to the 2019 NYS Bail Reform? 
H1: Each of the nine quality of life misdemeanor offenses subject to the 2019 NYS Bail 
Reform will increase in New York City. 
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RQ2: Is there any change in frequency among the total number of quality of life 
misdemeanor complaints by NYC Boroughs after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform? 
H2: The total number of quality-of-life misdemeanor complaints in Brooklyn and 
Manhattan, compared to other NYC Boroughs, will increase after the passage of the 2019 NYS 
Bail Reform. 
RQ3: What is the difference in the total number of quality of life misdemeanor complaints 
after the passage of the 2019 NYS Bail Reform in New York City? 
H3: The total number of quality of life misdemeanor complaints after the passage of the 
2019 NYS Bail Reform will increase in New York City. 
To understand the current discussion, one should understand the implementation of the 
bail reform in the mid-20th century in the U.S. Much literature discusses the evolution of bail 
reform acts from 1966 to the present and the impact of BWT on policing strategies. However, 
there is a limitation of existing research on the effect of bail reform on QOL misdemeanor 
offenses complaints that this study is looking to address. 
Literature Review 
The Broken Windows Theory 
 According to Kelling and Wilson (1982), neighborhoods that fail to fix their broken 
windows or address other disorder manifestations demonstrate a lack of informal social control, 
increased residents’ fear, and encouragement for violent crimes. BWT indicates that the 
connection between disorder and violent crime associates with a developmental sequence 
(Kelling & Wilson, 1982, para. 11). In the late 1970s, Kelling and Wilson (1982) developed 
BWT during the New Jersey State-funded “Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program.” The 
analysis of that program, a “carefully controlled experiment carried out in Newark” in 
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predominantly black communities, revealed that the “foot patrol project” had not decreased 
crime rates (Kelling & Wilson, 1982, para. 1).  
 Even though foot patrol did not decrease crime rates, Kelling and Wilson (1982) felt 
enough evidence was on the surface to look closely into public order maintenance. According to 
Kelling and Wilson (1982), on the neighborhood level, disorder and crime are “inextricably 
linked” into the developmental sequence (para. 11). The authors suggest that the attitude of “no 
one cares” and “do not get involved” among people in a community leads to problems: unruly 
teenagers, people partaking in street fights, drunks roaming the streets, and panhandlers 
bothering pedestrians (Kelling & Wilson, 1982, para. 14). Additionally, following Kelling and 
Wilson (1982), abandoned properties lead to informal community controls’ breakdown. 
Therefore, the neighborhood is perceived not as a “home” but only as a place where people live, 
and residents will start avoiding and fearing each other (Kelling & Wilson, 1982, para. 14). As a 
result, the neighborhood will become vulnerable to crime and violence, and residents will call the 
police to solve their problems. Nevertheless, arrests will not decrease the disorder, and thus, the 
cycle will continue. 
 However, the residents of foot-patrolled neighborhoods favored police presence. They 
perceived police presence as a fact that made their communities safer and, more importantly, 
satisfied neighborhoods’ need for public order (Kelling & Wilson, 1982). It is necessary to point 
out that, in the 1980s, Kelling and Wilson (1982) stressed the positive effect of foot patrol or 
community policing on the perception of public safety. Moreover, they pointed out that “police-
citizen encounters are powerfully altered by the automobile” as the car’s door is considered a 
barrier to approaching a police officer (Kelling and Wilson, 1982, para. 26). An officer on foot is 
approachable and provides residents with a sense of importance. It is a sense that authorities 
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representing the community care about it and are willing to listen to community members’ 
grievances or suggestions. Eventually, community policing developed into the quality of life 
policing, which required the police to focus on social and physical disorders and minor crimes. 
Quality of life policing        
Whereas it is not possible to identify the exact time at which QOL policing became one 
of the official community policing strategies, previous research indicates widespread 
implementation began around the 1990s (Johnson, Golub, & McCabe, 2010, p. 18). In 1990, 
NYC “accounted for 2.9 percent of the U.S. population and 9.6 percent of the country’s 
homicides” (Bratton, 2015, p. 1). Combating the rising crime, NYC Mayor David Dinkins (1990-
1993) proposed legislation called “Safe Streets, Safe City,” which “dedicated a portion of taxes 
and surcharges to hire 5,000 NYPD officers” to ensure citizen’s safety on NYC streets (Johnson, 
Golub, & McCabe, 2010, p. 18).  
Simultaneously, the NYC Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) subway system 
was in a state of despair than were the streets: the trains, tunnels, and stations were covered with 
graffiti and became infested with crime and disorder. The newly-hired New York City Transit 
Police Chief Bratton (1990-1992) began to apply BWT and the QOL policing in the subway 
system by vigorously focusing on underground crimes such as graffiti and fare evasion. 
According to Bratton (2015), “low-level disorder signaled lawlessness” and “subway criminal 
arrested for a misdemeanor…would not be victimizing anyone for a while” (p. 2). The subway 
crime rate was down by 35.9 percent from 1990 through 1993. However, QOL policing was less 
rigorous above ground on NYC streets during the same period, and street crime fell only 17.9 
percent between 1990 and 1993 (Bratton, 2015, p. 2).  
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Therefore, the next NYC Mayor Giuliani (1994-2001) argued that increasing the police 
force up to 38,310 officers was not a factor for a crime drop in NYC but a result of implementing 
QOL policing (Firestone, 1996, para. 3). The QOL policing, supported by NYC Mayor Giuliani, 
included refurbishing subway cars, preventing fare evasion, ejection of loitering youth, the 
expulsion of homeless persons from MTA properties, and painting over graffiti, which provided 
riders with a sense of safety (Katz, Webb, & Schaefer, 2001, p. 833). 
Eventually, from QOL-transit-authority policing, the strategy started addressing and 
resolving everyday problems reported by the community. A proponent of QOL policing, William 
Bratton, was promoted to the NYPD Commissioner’s rank and combined QOL policing with the 
Compare Statistics program (COMPSTAT) (NYPD, 2020). In 1994, COMPSTAT was 
implemented as “part of the standardized set of law enforcement tools” and NYPD Strategy 
Number 5 in the “Reclaiming the Streets of New York City” initiative (Johnson, Golub, & 
McCabe, 2010, p. 20). NYPD Commissioner Bratton regarded community policing as an 
essential tool in maintaining contact with the public and offering a sense of security; however, he 
believed that such policing would not work fully without focusing on crime (Bratton & Knobler, 
1998, p. 198).  
Nevertheless, the QOL policing strategy started to target the minority communities and 
be weak in deterrence (McArdle & Erzen, 2001, p. 3; Golub et al., 2003, p. 703). The NYPD 
initiated the pilot QOL policing in 1994 at the NYPD 6th Precinct, located in the West Village, a 
historically gay community and a tourist destination with extravagant bars and restaurants 
(McArdle & Erzen, 2001, p. 26). Three years later, the 6th Precinct “issued 7,400 summonses,” a 
number that was higher than the whole number of Borough of Manhattan summonses combined 
(McArdle & Erzen, 2001, p. 26). Equally importantly, “in 2000, Black adults were nearly six 
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times more likely to be arrested," than were Whites, while Latino adults "were more than three 
times likely to be arrested" than were Whites based on their ratio to the residential population, 
for offenses such as "smoking marijuana in public view" (Johnson et al., 2008, p. 232).  
Interestingly, in the first systematic research of QOL policing, Golub et al. (2003) 
investigated whether and how QOL policing was effective. Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring 
(ADAM) Policing Study by Golub et al. (2003) assessed 539 NYC arrestees (65 percent Blacks, 
24 percent Latino, and 11 percent Whites) on their “awareness of” and “response to” QOL 
policing (Golub et al., 2003, p. 691). Their findings showed that as of 1999, NYC arrestees, 
while “engaged in disorderly- behaviors, were significantly more likely to be aware of the QOL 
policing initiatives” and that the NYPD did not endure disorderly behaviors (Golub et al., 2003, 
p.702). However, the significant awareness of the QOL policing did not change their disorderly 
behaviors, and QOL policing served only as a general deterrent; thus, “this deterrent effect is 
short-lived” (Golub et al., 2003, p. 703). 
Furthermore, the recent New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) assessment of the 
NYC Mayor Bloomberg’s administration (2002-2013) revealed that “Black and Latino residents 
were more likely to be subjected” to QOL policing (Kamalu & Onyeozili, 2018, p. 82). Also, 
Black and Latino youth aged 14-24 years in NYC were more likely to be subjected to street 
interrogations (Kamalu & Onyeozili, 2018, p. 82). Moreover, this study found that “9 out of 10” 
(90 percent) occurrences “have been innocent stops,” with the higher frequency of total innocent 
stops “among Blacks (about 1 in 2) accompanied by Latino (about 1 in 3)” (Kamalu & 
Onyeozili, 2018, p. 83). In contrast, “innocent stops” of Whites happened about 1 in 10 
occurrences (Kamalu & Onyeozili, 2018, p. 83). Also, residents saw the QOL policing as a 
continuation of demonizing Blacks that unreasonably criminalizes and infringes the rights and 
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liberties of a “generation of Black and Hispanic boys living and growing” up in NYC (Brown, 
2013, p. 1). 
 However, police unions argue that NYC Mayors are using NYPD as their “backdoor tax-
collectors” by having police officers increase policing in certain neighborhoods and “make up 
for tax shortfalls using ticket and citation revenue” (Taibbi, 2014, para. 12). To demonstrate the 
rationale for their argument, police unions called for a virtual work stoppage in 2014 after 
requiring an increase in police officers’ safety following two NYPD officers’ assassination on 
Christmas Day (Celona, Cohen, & Golding, 2014, para. 4). Also, the NYPD report on QOL 
offenses arrests and arrests in victim-driven misdemeanor crimes, with break down along 
percentages, showed correlations: QOL offenses arrests of Blacks constituted 46.8 percent, 
Latino 34.6, and Whites 12.9 percent, while those arrested in victim-driven misdemeanor crimes 
were 47.7 percent Black, 35.6 percent Latino, and 13.5 percent White (Bratton, 2015, p. 6). 
While the NYC police unions’ requests were eventually granted, a national discussion about the 
role of police and bail reforms for QOL offenses became a top debating issue.  
Pretrial Detention in the United States 
In the U.S., the decision to detain, release or release on bail a criminally accused person 
before trial is one of the American criminal justice system's fundamental decisions. The Eighth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the U.S. “government from imposing cruel and 
unusual punishments.” excessive fines, and “excessive bail” (U.S. Const. amend. VIII). In Stack 
v. Boyle (1951), the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) recognized the “traditional 
right to freedom before conviction” and “that bail is excessive if” the amount is “higher than is 
reasonably calculated.”2  
 
2 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1,3 (1951). 
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Under this legal notion of the U.S. criminal justice system, if a person is accused of a 
crime and arrested, that person is considered innocent until proven guilty and can post bail to 
ensure appearance at trial. Simultaneously, SCOTUS has never recognized a criminally accused 
person’s right to bail as an absolute right. In the United States v. Salerno (1987), SCOTUS 
asserted that the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution “says nothing about whether bail 
should be available at all” and held that the government could limit the availability of bail.3 
Consequently, this legal principle implies that the criminally accused person has a right to appear 
in front of the judicial officer or judge. According to the procedures, the judge makes a pretrial 
release decision with two goals: to ensure the defendant’s court appearance and ensure 
community safety (American Bar Association [ABA], Standards for Criminal Justice, 2007, p. 
36).  
This balance of the judicial process is essential to guarantee due process’s integrity that 
embraces criminal defendants’ constitutional rights and protects victims, witnesses, and 
communities from dangerous interferences. In NYS, a misdemeanor is an offense, other than a 
“traffic infraction,” for which a court may impose a sentence to a term of imprisonment more 
than fifteen days; however, for which a sentence to a “term of imprisonment in excess of one 
year cannot be imposed” (NYS Penal Law, 2020). Judges would categorize offenses as class A 
for the more serious misdemeanors, class B misdemeanors for less serious misdemeanors, and 
unclassified (other than traffic infractions) misdemeanors with different terms of imprisonment, 
fine, or both. Therefore, during the pretrial release decision, the judge determines whether to 
detain the accused defendant or release the defendant or bail bond back to the community until 
the trial. 
 
3 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987). 
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The common types of bail bonds are releases on recognizance (ROR), an actual cash 
bond of the bail amount, posts of a tangible property bond, and bond posts by the bonding 
company on behalf of the defendant. Consequently, those defendants who cannot afford the bail 
bond price remain in jail, and those who can afford the bond’s cost are released back to the 
community. 
The History of U.S. Bail Reforms 
 Assessing and evaluating bail reforms has been a challenge since the 1960s as there is 
little scholarly consensus on whether bail reforms effectively reduce the number of offenses. The 
Manhattan Bail Project led to the passing of the Bail Reform Act of 1966; however, what seemed 
a victory for social justice was the increased role of pretrial services agencies and ROR, leading 
to the disproportional pretrial detention of the indigent due to the lack of determining release 
factors. Lately, in 1984, the “War on Drugs” was at its climax combating crime, and the increase 
of public fear of crime forced the legislature to examine bail practices and address the problem of 
dangerousness and public safety (Chepesiuk, 1999, p. 198). The 2019 NYS Bail Reform was 
intended to provide fairness for the criminally accused and eliminated cash bail for many 
misdemeanor crimes but is seen as a revolving door for offenders by the bail reform opponents. 
The Bail Reform Act of 1966         
Back in 1961, NYC private citizen and philanthropist Louis Schweitzer, concerned with 
the unfair treatment of the indigent person of NYC and the number of impoverished people on 
pretrial sentencing, founded the Vera Foundation in conjunction with the School of Law at New 
York University and the Ford Foundation. The partnership initiated a three-year-long experiment 
called The Manhattan Bail Project (Fair Treatment for Indigent, 2011, p. 10; Center for Strategic 
Philanthropy and Civil Society [CSPCS], 2007).  
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The Manhattan Bail Project findings showed that judges could grant pretrial parole and 
ROR without imposed bail and doubts on the accused person’s court appearance with the 
objective inquiries into defendants’ background, identified ties to the community, and 
employment. With bail recommendation from the pretrial services for the judge, the findings 
showed that out of the 3,505 defendants released on ROR, only 56 defendants, or “1.6 percent of 
the total, failed to appear at their trials” (Van Brunt & Bowman, 2018, p. 724).  
The pervasiveness of the number of impoverished people in pretrial sentencing and 
conditions on confinement in jails in the 1960s was of great concern for civil liberties and rights 
advocates and progressives. The Manhattan Bail Project findings were supported by then 
SCOTUS Chief Justice Earl Warren, U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and the NYS 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court Justice Bernard Botein. Support for the policy that 
started in NYC and NYS’s criminal courts provided an impetus for the country’s first bail reform 
movement. Henceforth, in 1966, the U.S. Congress enacted the Bail Reform Act (1966), signed 
by President Lyndon B. Johnson. That bill, along with other provisions, provided a statutory 
right for the non-capital defendant to a pretrial release and ROR (Fair Treatment for Indigent, 
2011, p. 12).  
The Manhattan Bail Project preceded the signing of the Bail Reform of 1966; however, 
seen as a victory for social justice in 1966, it increased pretrial services agencies' role. Their 
crucial functions were gathering and presenting defendants’ backgrounds, identifying ties to the 
community, and employment. The lack of these determining release factors for ROR led to 
disproportional pretrial detention of the indigent and people of color. Moreover, the significant 
problem arising from the Bail Reform of 1966 was public fear of the pretrial release of 
defendants who were either narcotic addicts or drug users going back to the communities. 
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The Bail Reform Act of 1984 
The initiation of the War on Drugs in the 1970s, the U.S. economic upheavals, and the 
rise of public fear of crime forced the legislature to re-examine bail practices and address the 
problem of dangerousness. In the Post-Vietnam era in the US, most indigent people lacked 
determining stable employment, ties to the community, and reputation for risk assessment 
validation. Thus, the practice of a surety bond in the bail system began to rise. Consequently, 
those defendants who were denied ROR and could not afford bail bond services remained in jail. 
On the other hand, defendants who were able to afford the bail bond agencies' services were 
released back to the communities, which in turn perceived them as a risk to public safety 
(Walker, 2016, p. 14). Big cities and minority communities were living in “fear and dread,” 
facing the “negative impact” from the “crack craze” on their economies and property losses due 
to the crimes and outbreaks of violence (Latzer, 2016, para. 35). 
In 1983, members of the U.S. Congress initiated the second bail reform movement to 
address public safety. The U.S. Senate summarized and addressed the variety of revisions on the 
existence of “a small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants” whose pretrial 
release undermines “the safety of the community or other persons” (Goldkamp, 1985, p. 1-2). As 
a result of this assessment, in 1984, the U.S. Congress passed the Bail Reform Act (1984) that 
repealed the Bail Reform of 1966 and allowed judges to temporarily or entirely detain a 
defendant before trial on the grounds of dangerousness to the public. Later, in 1988, the U. S. 
Department of Justice (USDOJ) released a Special Report that evaluated data concerning the 
implementation of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (USDOJ Bureau of Statistics [BOS], 1988). 
Among other significant findings, the report indicated “that the likelihood of pretrial detention 
was 63 percent higher” for those defendants who caused injury during their offenses and 17 
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percent higher for those classified as dangerous during the pretrial hearing (USDOJ Bureau of 
Statistics [BOS], 1988, p. 1). The War on Drugs, at its peak, was combating crime with new 
policing strategies. In conjunction with the new Bail Reform of 1984, in five NYPD precincts 
that covered Harlem and Brooklyn’s Bedford-Stuyvesant with “populations that were over 80 
percent black and suffered from high poverty,” the murder rate dropped 78 percent in the 1990s 
with NYC citywide decline of 73 percent (Latzer, 2016, para. 23).  
After the 1980s, New York State would not revisit bail procedures for the next thirty 
years. In 2012, NYS Governor Andrew M. Cuomo signed a law that required “judges to consider 
risk factors” when setting bail requirements for offenders charged with “offense against a family 
or household member” in domestic violence (Blain, 2012, para.6). This preventive measure did 
not create public scrutiny, as it was evident with the first two bail reforms, and it received limited 
press coverage. However, the 2019 NYS Bail Reform split New Yorkers on the issue as there 
were both supporters and opponents of preventive detention arguing on the law's public safety 
component. 
2019 New York State Bail Reform       
The high rates of pretrial detention in NYS concerned Governor Cuomo, and in 2018 he 
proposed a progressive set of five reforms to repair NYS’s criminal justice system (NYS 
Government, 2018). One of the reforms included eliminating cash bail and pretrial detention for 
most misdemeanor offenses (NYS Government, 2018, para. 2). The 2019 NYS Bail Reform was 
adopted on April 1, 2019, and perceived as a precursor for a third national movement for bail 
reform.  
Even though NYC pioneered bail reforms in previous decades, the 2019 NYS Bail 
Reform became a controversial and highly debated legislation amongst its supporters and 
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opponents. On the one hand, advocates for civil rights and liberties demanded the criminal 
justice system's fairness and elimination of the cash bail system (Merkl, 2019, para. 3). On the 
other hand, the District Attorneys (DA) of Brooklyn, the Bronx, and Manhattan supported the 
elimination of cash bail “so that people are not detained simply because they are poor” 
(Gonzalez et al., 2019, para. 8). However, DAs raised their concerns that it is a “dangerous 
mistake” not to “allow the court to detain, before trial, a defendant who poses a credible and 
identifiable threat to the public” (Gonzalez et al., 2019, para. 8).  
Innocent until proven guilty standard: Protecting indigent persons  
In the criminal justice system, the preventive detention strategy implies detaining 
someone before their trial “because they pose a risk to public safety” (CACL, 2017, p. 1). NYS 
found itself in the midst of the controversy over the 2019 Bail Reform by abandoning preventive 
detention in most misdemeanor cases. Under the American criminal justice system's legal 
principle, a person accused of a crime is considered innocent until proven guilty in the court of 
law and can post bail before the trial. The presumption of innocence aims to limit any suffering 
by the innocent through instituting due process. Due process protects a defendant’s right to a 
strong defense and guarantees that a penalty occurs after conviction.  
However, the presumption of innocence is responsible for the “presumption of release” 
under the Bail Reform Act of 1966. The Bail Reform Act of 1966 mandates ROR in 
misdemeanor cases unless the judge decides that the defendant’s appearance at trial is a low 
probability. In NYS, for the last 50 years, the setting of the bail considered “only the defendant’s 
likelihood of coming to their appointed court date” (Asgarian, 2020, para. 6). Nevertheless, 
criminal justice advocates argue that just because “potential dangerousness has not been legally 
allowed does not mean it has not been the de facto use of bail by judges and prosecutors for 
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decades” (Asgarian, 2020, para. 6). In addition, criminal justice advocates argue that the 
commercial side of the bail bond has directed bail “into a policy with its own lobby, adding 
friction to any reform efforts” (Lartey, 2020, para. 11). The 2019 Bail Reform was intended as 
fairness for the criminally accused and a step to reshaping NYS’s outdated bail system by 
eliminating cash bail for many misdemeanor crimes (NYS Government, 2018). However, the 
2019 Bail Reform was seen as a revolving door by opponents of the bail reform. 
The revolving door of 2019 Bail Reform  
Criminal justice researchers apply the phrase “revolving door” when discussing the rate 
of released ex-offenders returning to prison (Riley, 2017, para. 2). Recidivism is the act of 
repeated criminal activity of the offender despite being trusted to be released back to the 
communities. Moreover, states’ are practicing to cut the “public safety return on corrections 
spending” when facing fiscal crises (Pew Center on States, 2011, p.7). However, NYC 
communities were less supportive of these budget cuts. They perceived that offenders would use 
the bail reform as the revolving door to commit new crimes in NYC without proper reprimand 
for previous offenses. 
The conservative media, concerned with public safety and the fact that NYC judges are 
powerless to consider the offender's dangerousness during pretrial hearings, began addressing 
and supporting the anti-reform voices. The practice of a revolving door of the criminal justice 
system with people moving in and out of the system was disappointing to the bail reform 
opponents. However, they were immediately ostracized by progressives and criticized by 
criminal law experts at universities and colleges in New York for ambiguous and exaggerated 
coverage (Bader et al., 2020, para. 1). Nevertheless, two pretrial release cases sparked outrage in 
NYC: (1) Tiffany Harris, who assaulted a Jewish woman in Brooklyn, and (2) Charles Barry, 
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who scammed a foreign tourist in the MTA system (Jasper, 2020, p. 21). In addition to 
scamming a foreign tourist in the MTA system, Charles Barry had “more than 142 arrests 
spanning three decades,” and 21 skipped court hearings (Goldberg & Annese, 2020, para. 2; 
Jasper, 2020, p. 21). 
NYC residents started to resent the 2019 Bail Reform, with “the percentage of New 
Yorkers saying the changes would be good for the state” falling from 55%in 2019 to 37% in 
January 2020 (Lartey, 2020, para. 5). NYC residents highly criticized the Bail Reform, arguing 
that it endangers their communities and allows for more QOL misdemeanor crimes because the 
alleged offenders are released during their court processing and subsequently commit additional 
crimes.  
In collaboration with NYC communities, Manhattan District Attorney Cy Vance 
requested the NYS Governor Andrew Cuomo to apply his emergency powers “to give judges the 
authority to set bail for those posing danger to society” (Jasper, 2020, p. 19). Moderate 
Democratic legislators, NYPD Commissioner Dermot Shea (2019-present), and NYC Mayor Bill 
de Blasio supported the call to fix the 2019 Bail Reform Act due to the spike in crimes (Coltin, 
2020, para. 3). Consequently, in March 2020, the deadly coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) has 
reached the U.S. shores, and President Donald Trump declared a National Emergency that 
prompted the closure of federal and state agencies (Jacobs et al., 2020, para. 1). By March 14, 
2020, the first NYC resident was claimed by a coronavirus, and NYC Mayor De Blasio was 
dealing with closures of all agencies, institutions, and venues in NYC and the rise of infections 
(Croft, 2020, para. 1).  
Nevertheless, the backlash from law enforcement, prosecution, Democrats in swing 
districts, and Republicans that the 2019 Bail reform and budget agreements are not enough to 
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address public safety concerns lead to a heated debate in the NYS Assembly Chamber on April 
2, 2020 (Harris & Bragg, 2020, para. 21). Only a day before voting on the 2020 NYS Fiscal Year 
Budget, NYS legislators agreed to pass into the budget several bail-eligible crimes that included 
offenses of criminal possession of a weapon on school grounds and sex trafficking.  
However, the 2020 bail reform's changes disappointed the 2019 Bail Reform supporters. 
They were disappointed that NYS Assembly added controversial, from their point of view, 
changes to the bail reform that placed people back into pretrial detention while “governments are 
literally releasing people from jail because of COVID-19” pandemic (Nanos, 2020, para. 1). The 
amendment went into effect on July 1, 2020, and provided judges more situations to impose cash 
bail (Merkl, 2020, para. 12). However, the original bail reform's basic framework remained 
intact, prohibiting imposing cash bail for most misdemeanors and requiring less restrictive 
conditions to ensure the defendant's court appearance. 
Methodology 
Data 
The current data comes from a publicly available secondary source from Open Data of 
the New York City Government as two data sets that include all reported to the NYPD violation, 
misdemeanors, and felony crimes: NYPD Complaint Data Historic that includes reported 
complaints from 2006 to 20194 and NYPD Complaint Data (Year to Date)5 that reports 
complaints in 2020 (NYC Open Data, 2016; NYC Open Data, 2020). The data includes thirty-six 
variables, including but not limited to the date of the incident, the NYPD precinct in which the 
incident was reported, the NYC Borough in which the incident was reported, level of offense, 
suspects demographics, and victims demographics. The overall number of complaints in the 
 
4 Retrieved October 06, 2020. 
5 Retrieved January 31, 2021 
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NYPD Complaint Data Historic dataset includes 6.98 million incidents that resulted from 
violations, misdemeanors, and felony offenses. For this study, the overall number of complaints 
in the NYPD Complaint Data Historic dataset for 2019 includes 450,976 incidents resulting from 
violations, misdemeanors, and felony offenses, from which 241,775 of all misdemeanor offenses 
were selected. The overall number of complaints in the 2020 NYPD Complaint Data Year to 
Date dataset includes 413,412 incidents resulting from violations, misdemeanors, felony 
offenses, from which 211,170 of all misdemeanors offenses in 2020 were selected (NYC Open 
Data, 2016; NYC Open Data, 2020).  
The unit of analysis is reported misdemeanor complaints (n = 196,577). For this study, 
only nine QOL misdemeanor complaint incidents were analyzed for the 2019-2020 period. The 
total number of nine QOL misdemeanor complaints (n = 108,382) was retrieved from the NYPD 
Complaint Historic data misdemeanor offenses for the period from January 1, 2019, to December 
31, 2019 (NYC Open Data, 2016). In addition, the total number of nine QOL misdemeanor 
complaints (n = 88,195) was retrieved from the NYPD Complaint Data for the period from 
January 1, 2020, to December 31, 2020 (NYC Open Data, 2020). The study compares the 
frequency of the nine QOL misdemeanor complaints to the 2019 NYS Bail Reform and 
demographics, and all variables are presented in Table 1. 
Variables 
A set of nine categorical variables were operationally defined as meeting the legal 
definition of misdemeanor offenses established by the NYS Penal Law (2020) (see Appendix A). 
The nine categorical variables of this study were coded as (=1) aggravated harassment 2, (=2) 
assault 3, (=3) controlled substance, possession, (=4) graffiti, (=5) criminal mischief, 
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unclassified, (=6) larceny, petit from open areas, (=7) menacing, (=8) sexual abuse, and (=9) 
trespass 2.  
The 2019 NYS Bail Reform is dichotomous. The categorical variable was coded as (=0) 
before the 2019 NYS Bail Reform Act passage and (=1) after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform 
passage. Considering the data were analyzed to test several hypotheses, data were tested at the 
incident level by each year (2019 and 2020), and in other instances, it was aggregated to the 
NYC Borough level. 
A set of variables reflect demographics such as age, race, and sex. The age category is 
scale variable, and it was coded for both victims and suspects categories as (=1) for less than 18 
years old, (=2) from 18-24 years, (=3) from 25-44 years, (=4) from 45-64 years, and (=5) from 
65+ years. The race categorical variables for both victims and suspects were broken down into 
(=1) American Indian/Alaskan Native, (=2) Asian/Pacific Islander, (=3) Black, (=4) Black 
Hispanic, (=5) White, and (=6) White Hispanic. The sex categorical variables for victims and 
suspects were dichotomous and coded as (=0) female and (=1) male. 
The categorical variables NYS boroughs, where offenses took place, were coded as (=1) 
Bronx, (=2) Brooklyn, (=3) Manhattan, (=4) Queens, and (=5) Staten Island. In 1898, NYC was 
consolidated, and boroughs allocated the precinct numbers. The allocation of precincts numbers 
was 1 to 39 for Manhattan, 40 to 59 for the Bronx, 60 to 99 for Brooklyn, 100 to 119 for Queens, 
and 120 and up for Staten Island (La Gorce, 2017). For the purpose of this study, seventy-seven 
NYPD precincts were aggregated according to their locations across NYC boroughs into five 
groups:  twelve in Bronx (=1), twenty-three in Brooklyn (=2), sixteen in Queens (=3), twenty-





The BWT implies that anti-social conduct and civil disturbance foster an inner-city 
“environment that encourages further lawlessness and disorder” (Kelling & Wilson, 1982). NYC 
residents highly criticized the 2019 NYS Bail Reform, arguing that it endangers their 
communities and allows for more QOL misdemeanor crimes because the alleged offenders are 
released during their court processing and subsequently commit additional crimes.  
Several statistical tests will be used to address three research questions:  
(1) RQ1: Is there any change in individual frequency among the nine quality of 
life misdemeanor complaints subject to the 2019 NYS Bail Reform? 
(2) RQ2: Is there any change in frequency among the total number of nine quality 
of life misdemeanor complaints by NYC Boroughs after the 2019 NYS Bail 
Reform? 
(3) RQ3: What is the difference in the total number of quality of life misdemeanor 
complaints after the passage of the 2019 NYS Bail Reform in New York City? 
SPSS v.27 was used to analyze these data. Following the coding scheme of the variables, 
several statistical analyses were conducted. Basic descriptive statistics were used to describe the 
frequencies of the data and any change in individual frequency among the nine QOL 
misdemeanor complaints subject to the 2019 NYS Bail Reform. Crosstabs analysis was used to 
explore the frequency distribution of nine QOL misdemeanor complaints and their year of 
occurrence. Also, crosstab analysis was run to explore the frequency of distribution of nine QOL 
misdemeanor complaints by NYC Boroughs before and after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform. Lastly, 
a paired sample t-test was used to test the difference in the total number of QOL misdemeanor 
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 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. From 2019 to 2020, there were N = 196,577 
reported QOL misdemeanor complaints of our interest in the NYPD datasets (NYC Open Data, 
2016; NYC Open Data, 2020). In terms of individual frequency among the nine QOL 
misdemeanor complaints subject to the 2019 NYS Bail Reform, there were n = 108,382 reported 
complaints in 2019, and n = 88,195 complaints were reported in 2020. The majority of 
misdemeanor complaints were assaults in third degree (38.4%), followed by misdemeanor 
complaints of aggravated harassment in the second degree (16.0%), of criminal mischiefs 
(12.2%), graffiti making (9.3%), menacing (7.8%), petit larceny (6.6%), controlled substance 
possession (5.0%), sexual abuse (2.8%), and trespass in the second degree (2.0%).  
 In terms of suspects’ age during the offense, most suspects were between 25 and 44 years 
(56.5%), followed by those who were between 45 and 64 years (18.2%) and suspects between 18 
and 24 years old (8.1%). The majority of the reported suspects were Blacks (49.4%), followed by 
White Hispanics (25.1%), Whites (11.9%), Black Hispanics (7.9), Asian / Pacific Islanders 
(5.3%), and American Indian / Alaskan Native (0.4%). Most offenses were done by male 
suspects (75.0%) compared to females (25.2%). In terms of victims’ age, most victims were 
between 25 and 44 years (50.7%), followed by those who were between 45 and 64 years (24.2%) 
and those between 18 and 24 years (15.3%). The majority of the victims were Blacks (39.0%), 
followed by White Hispanics (27.5%), Whites (17.4%), Asian / Pacific Islanders (9.0%), Black 
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Hispanics (6.5%), and American Indian / Alaskan Native (0.6%). While there were male victims 
(43.8%), more females were victims of the misdemeanor offenses (56.2%). 
 In terms of the administrative jurisdiction by NYC boroughs, most of the incidents 
occurred in Brooklyn (28.0%), followed by Bronx (24.3%), Manhattan (23.9%), Queens 
(19.4%), and Staten Island (4.5%). 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics in the Study 
 Variables and Metrics n % 
 Misdemeanor Quality of Life Offenses   
 (1) Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree (=1), 31,435 16.0 
  (2) Assault in the third degree (=2), 75,492 38.4 
  (3) Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the 
seventh degree (=3), 
9,758 5.0 
  (4) Making graffiti (=4), 18,256 9.3 
  (5) Criminal Mischief (=5), 24,017 12.2 
  (6) Petit larceny from the open area (=6), 12,913 6.6 
  (7) Menacing in the second degree (=7), 15,272 7.8 
  (8) Sexual abuse in the second degree (=8), 5,460 2.8 
  (9) Criminal trespass in the second degree (=9). 3,974 2.0 
 Total 196,577 100.0 
 The 2019 NYS Bail Reform Act (See New York State Government, 
2018) 
  
  Year 2019: Before the 2019 Bail Reform (=0), 108,382 55.1 
  Year 2020: After the 2019 Bail Reform (=1). 88,195 44.9 
 Total 196,577 100.0 
    
 Suspects’ Age Group   
  Less than 18 years old (=1), 5,883 5.6 
  18-24 years (=2), 19,202 18.1 
  25-44 years (=3), 59,836 56.5 
  45-64 years (=4), 19,265 18.2 
  65+ years (=5).  1,650 1.6 
 Total 105,836 100.0 
 Suspect’s Race      
  American Indian / Alaskan Native (=1), 460 0.4 
  Asian / Pacific Islander (=2), 6,781 5.3 
  Black (=3), 62,577 49.4 
  Black Hispanic (=4), 10,026 7.9 
  White (=5), 15,049 11.9 
  White Hispanic (=5). 31,874 25.1 
 Total 126,767 100.0 
 Suspect’s Sex      
  Female (=0), 33,702 25.2 
  Male (=1). 100,286 75.0 
 Total 133,988 100.0 
 Victim’s Age Group      
  Less than 18 years old (=1), 10,132 6.6 
  18-24 (=2), 23,652 15.3 
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  25-44 (=3), 78,154 50.7 
  45-64 (=4), 37,369 24.2 
  65+ years (=5). 4,886 3.2 
 Total 154,193 100.0 
 Victim’s Race      
  American Indian / Alaskan Native (=1), 874 0.6 
  Asian / Pacific Islander (=2), 13,539 9.0 
  Black (=3), 58,631 39.0 
  Black Hispanic (=4), 9,727 6.5 
  White (=5), 26,176 17.4 
  White Hispanic (=6). 41,376 27.5 
 Total 150,323 100.0 
 Victim’s Sex      
  Female (=0), 88,723 56.2 
  Male (=1). 69,281 43.8 
 Total 158,004 100.0 
 NYC Borough   
  Bronx (=1), 47,677 24.3 
  Brooklyn (=2), 54,988 28.0 
  Manhattan (=3), 46,960 23.9 
  Queens (=4), 38,058 19.4 
  Staten Island (=5). 8,881 4.5 
 Total 196,564 100.0 
    
Crosstab Analysis 
A crosstab analysis was run to explore the frequency distribution of nine QOL 
misdemeanor complaints and their year of occurrence. Table 2 is a Crosstabs analysis of the total 
QOL (N = 196,577) misdemeanor complaints for 2019 (n = 108,382) and 2020 (n = 88,195), 
with the total individual frequency of each QOL misdemeanor offense as follows: aggravated 
harassment in the second degree (n =31,435), assault in the third degree (n = 75,492), criminal 
possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (n= 9,758), making graffiti (n= 
18,256), criminal mischief in the fourth degree (n= 24,017), petit larceny from the open area (n= 
12,913), menacing in the second degree (n= 15,272), sexual abuse in the second degree (n= 







QOL Misdemeanor Complaints Individual Frequency by Complaint Year (N = 196,577) 
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2019 n 17,477 42,277 6,375 9,925 11,542 7,628 7,541 3,228 2,389 108,382 
% 8.9 21.5 3.2 5.0 5.9 3.9 3.8 1.6 1.2 55.1 
2020 n 13,958 33,215 3,383 8331 12,475 5,285 7,731 2,232 1,585 88,195 
% 7.1 16.9 1.7 4.2 6.3 2.7 3.9 1.1 0.8 44.9 
Total n 31,435 75,492 9,758 18,256 24,017 12,913 15,272 5,460 3,974 196,577 
% 16.0 38.4 5.0 9.3 12.2 6.6 7.8 2.8 2.0 100.0 
The crosstab analysis did not support Hypothesis 1 since not all of the nine QOL 
misdemeanor complaints saw an increase in individual frequency after the 2019 NYS Bail 
Reform (see Figure 1). Among the nine QOL misdemeanor complaints, criminal possession of a 
controlled substance in the seventh degree had the highest decrease in reported complaints after 
the 2019 NYS Bail Reform (46.9%). Also, there were considerable decreases in the reported 
criminal trespasses in the second degree (33%), sexual abuse in the second degree (30.9%), and 
petit larceny from the open year (30.7%), respectively (See Figure 1). 
Nevertheless, our Research Question 1 on whether there was any change in individual 
frequency among the nine quality of life misdemeanor complaints subject to the 2019 NYS Bail 
Reform was supported by a crosstab analysis. There was an increase in individual frequency 
after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform in two categories: criminal mischief in the fourth degree (n= 
24,017) and menacing in the second degree (n = 15,272) (See Figure 1). In 2020, after the 2019 
NYS Bail Reform, criminal mischief in the fourth degree (n = 12,475) saw an overall increase of 
8.1% compared to 2019 (n = 11,542). Furthermore, in 2020, after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform, 
there was a 2.5% increase in menacing complaints (n = 7,731) compared to menacing complaints 




 The difference in Individual Frequency in QOL Misdemeanor Complaints Before and After the 
2019 NYS Bail Reform (2019-2020)   
 
 
Note. Data from the NYPD Complaint Data Historic. Retrieved on November 16, 2020, 
 from  https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Public-Safety/NYPD-Complaint-Data-Historic/qgea-i56i 
Data from the NYPD Complaint Data Current: Year to Date. Retrieved on January 31, 2021,  
from https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Public-Safety/NYPD-Complaint-Data-Current-Year-To-Date-/5uac-w243  
 
 Table 3 is a Crosstabs analysis of the QOL misdemeanor complaints (n = 126,767), by 
offender’s race: American Indian/Alaskan Native (n = 460), Asian / Pacific Islander (n= 6,781), 
Black (n = 62,577), Black Hispanic (n = 10,026), White (n = 15,049), and White Hispanic (n = 
31,874). In 2020, there was a decrease in reported complaints of criminal possession of a 
controlled substance in the seventh degree among offenders identified as Blacks (49.23%), White 
Hispanics (46.47%), and Whites (45.8%). Similarly, reported complaints of sexual abuse in the 
second degree saw a considerable decrease across the groups, Whites (51.26%), White Hispanics 
(29.37%), and Blacks (24.83%). Interestingly, there was a decrease in reported complaints on 
making graffiti among offenders identified as Whites (45.8%), though there was an increase in 
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reported complaints on offenders identified as White Hispanics (14.2%) and Blacks (6.12%) (See 
Table 3). 
Table 3 
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n 75 124 9 2 20 6 25 16 4 281 




n 673 1,980 111 27 249 77 345 213 129 3,804 
%  1.0 2.8 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 5.4 
Black n 5,740 16,807 2,068 147 3,324 1,027 3,508 894 888 34,403 
%  8.1 23.8 2.9 0.2 4.7 1.5 5.0 1.3 1.3 48.7 
Black 
Hispanic 
n 988 2,678 556 47 465 112 524 183 111 5,664 
%  1.4 3.8 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.2 8.0 
White n 2,020 3,580 786 278 656 249 520 357 257 8,703 
%  2.9 5.1 1.1 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.4 12.3 
White 
Hispanic 
n 2,867 8,804 1,773 176 1304 425 1,505 521 408 17,783 
%  4.1 12.5 2.5 0.2 1.8 0.6 2.1 0.7 0.6 25.2 
 n 12,363 33,973 5,303 677 6,018 1,896 6,427 2,184 1,797 70,638 





















n 44 85 6 0 17 4 18 4 1 179 




n 525 1,601 69 13 214 44 342 123 46 2,977 
%  0.9 2.9 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 5.3 
Black n 4,720 13,365 1,050 156 3,306 763 3,562 672 580 28,174 
%  8.4 23.8 1.9 0.3 5.9 1.4 6.3 1.2 1.0 50.2 
Black 
Hispanic 
n 748 2,001 295 35 421 123 548 110 81 4,362 
%  1.3 3.6 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.1 7.8 
White n 1,362 2,623 426 195 669 187 529 174 181 6,346 
%  2.4 4.7 0.8 0.3 1.2 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.3 11.3 
White 
Hispanic 
n 2,278 6,951 949 201 1,265 291 1,549 368 239 14,091 
%  4.1 12.4 1.7 0.4 2.3 0.5 2.8 0.7 0.4 25.1 
 n 9,677 26,626 2,795 600 5,892 1,412 6,548 1,451 1,128 56,129 
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n 1,198 3,581 180 40 463 121 687 336 175 6,781 
%  0.9 2.8 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 5.3 
Black n 10,460 30,172 3,118 303 6,630 1,790 7,070 1,566 1,468 62,577 
%  8.3 23.8 2.5 0.2 5.2 1.4 5.6 1.2 1.2 49.4 
Black 
Hispanic 
n 1,736 4,679 851 82 886 235 1,072 293 192 10,026 
%  1.4 3.7 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.2 7.9 
White n 3,382 6,203 1,212 473 1,325 436 1,049 531 438 15,049 
%  2.7 4.9 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.3 11.9 
White 
Hispanic 
n 5,145 15,755 2,722 377 2,569 716 3,054 889 647 31,874 
%  4.1 12.4 2.1 0.3 2.0 0.6 2.4 0.7 0.5 25.1 
 n 22,040 60,599 8,098 1,277 11,910 3,308 12,975 3,635 2,925 126,767 




 Additional crosstab analysis was run to explore the frequency of distribution of nine QOL 
misdemeanor complaints by NYC Boroughs before and after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform. Table 
4 is a crosstabs analysis of the QOL misdemeanor complaints (n= 196,564), broken down by 
years of 2019 (n = 108,381) and 2020 (n = 88,183) and by NYC Boroughs (Bronx, Brooklyn, 
Manhattan, Queens, and Staten Island). In 2020, the total number of the nine QOL misdemeanor 
complaints in Bronx jurisdiction saw a decrease of 18.84 % (n = 4,957) after the 2019 NYS Bail 
Reform compared to 2019. Correspondingly, Queens saw a decline of the QOL misdemeanor 
complaints in 2020 after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform (n = 2,926, 14.28%) as well as Staten Island 
(n = 695, 14.52%) (See Figure 2).  
Table 4 











































 Bronx n 3,983 10,903 2,358 1,389 3,226 1,288 2,268 538 364 26,317 
% 3.7 10.1 2.2 1.3 3.0 1.2 2.1 0.5 0.3 24.3 
Brooklyn n 5,512 11,534 1,024 3,088 3,256 2,313 2,160 852 697 30,436 
%  5.1 10.6 0.9 2.8 3.0 2.1 2.0 0.8 0.6 28.1 
Manhattan n 3,897 9,439 2,433 2,957 2,235 2,281 1,366 1,118 622 26,348 
%  3.6 8.7 2.2 2.7 2.1 2.1 1.3 1.0 0.6 24.3 
Queens n 3,119 8,841 334 1,795 2,233 1,427 1,518 638 587 20,492 
%  2.9 8.2 0.3 1.7 2.1 1.3 1.4 0.6 0.5 18.9 
Staten  
Island 
n 966 1,559 226 696 592 319 229 82 119 4,788 
%  0.9 1.4 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 4.4 
 n 17,477 42,276 6,375 9,925 11,542 7,628 7,541 3,228 2,389 108,381 













 Bronx n 3,318 8,890 925 866 3,392 1,019 2,331 428 191 21,360 
% 3.8 10.1 1.0 1.0 3.8 1.2 2.6 0.5 0.2 24.2 
Brooklyn n 4,442 8,945 544 2,341 3,417 1,473 2,213 641 536 24,552 
% 5.0 10.1 0.6 2.7 3.9 1.7 2.5 0.7 0.6 27.8 
Manhattan n 2,874 6905 1,397 2,430 2,834 1,675 1,387 659 451 2,0612 
%  3.3 7.8 1.6 2.8 3.2 1.9 1.6 0.7 0.5 23.4 
Queens n 2,459 7,236 358 2,014 2,222 938 1,568 435 336 17,566 
%  2.8 8.2 0.4 2.3 2.5 1.1 1.8 0.5 0.4 19.9 
Staten  
Island 
n 865 1,235 158 678 609 180 231 66 71 4,093 
%  1.0 1.4 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 4.6 
 n 13,958 33,211 3,382 8,329 12,474 5,285 7,730 2,229 1,585 88,183 





 Bronx n 7,301 19,793 3,283 2,255 6,618 2,307 4,599 966 555 47,677 
%  3.7 10.1 1.7 1.1 3.4 1.2 2.3 0.5 0.3 24.3 
Brooklyn n 9,954 20,479 1,568 5,429 6,673 3,786 4,373 1,493 1,233 54,988 











Manhattan n 6,771 16,344 3,830 5,387 5,069 3,956 2,753 1,777 1,073 46,960 
%  3.4 8.3 1.9 2.7 2.6 2.0 1.4 0.9 0.5 23.9 
Queens n 5,578 16,077 692 3,809 4,455 2,365 3,086 1,073 923 38,058 
%  2.8 8.2 0.4 1.9 2.3 1.2 1.6 0.5 0.5 19.4 
Staten  
Island 
n 1,831 2,794 384 1,374 1,201 499 460 148 190 8,881 
%  0.9 1.4 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 4.5 
 n 31,435 75,487 9,757 18,254 24,016 12,913 15,271 5,457 3,974 196,564 
%  16.0 38.4 5.0 9.3 12.2 6.6 7.8 2.8 2.0 100.0 
 
Figure 2 
The difference in Total Frequency in QOL Misdemeanor Complaints by NYC Boroughs after the 
2019 NYS Bail Reform (2019-2020) 
 
 
Note. Data from the NYPD Complaint Data Historic. Retrieved on November 16, 2020, 
 from  https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Public-Safety/NYPD-Complaint-Data-Historic/qgea-i56i 
Data from the NYPD Complaint Data Current: Year to Date. Retrieved on January 31, 2021,  








The difference in Individual Frequency in Reported Criminal Mischief Complaints by NYC 
Boroughs after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform  
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The crosstab analysis did not support Hypothesis 2, as the total number of the nine QOL 
misdemeanors after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform decreased in Brooklyn (n = 5,884, 19.33%) and 
Manhattan (n = 5,736, 21.77%) (See Figure 3). However, the crosstab analysis revealed that 
there was a 26.80 % increase in reported complaints on criminal mischief after the 2019 NYS 
Bail Reform in Manhattan (n = 2834), compared to Bronx (n = 3,392, 5.15%), Brooklyn (n = 
3,417, 4.94%), and Staten Island (n = 609, 2.87%) (See Figure 3). 
Paired-Sample t-test Analysis 
To test the hypothesis that the means of QOL misdemeanor complaints before (M = 
2044.94, SD = 332.196) and after (M = 1664.06, SD = 287.770) the passage of the 2019 NYS 
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Bail Reform in NYC are equal, a dependent samples t-test was performed, 95% CI [301.179, 
460.594]. The 2019 and 2020 daily data was aggregated to a weekly level (n = 53). Prior to 
conducting the analysis, the assumption of normally distributed difference scores was explored. 
Visual inspection of the histogram reasonably met the approximately symmetric shape of a 
normal curve. The assumption was considered satisfied, as the skew and kurtosis levels were 
estimated at .012 and -.496, respectively, which is less than the maximum allowable values for a 
t-test (i.e., skew < 2.0 and kurtosis < 9.0. The Pearson Correlation coefficient measures the 
strength and direction of linear correlation between two sets of data. The correlation between the 
two terms was estimated at r = .57, p = .000, suggesting that the dependent samples t-test is 
appropriate in this case. The null hypothesis of equal means of the number of QOL misdemeanor 
complaints before and after the passage of the 2019 NYS Bail Reform in New York City was 
rejected, t(52) = 9.589, p = .000.  
Thus, after the passage of the 2019 NYS Bail Reform in NYC, the QOL misdemeanor 
complaints mean was statistically significantly lower than the mean of NYC QOL misdemeanor 
complaints before the passage of the 2019 NYS Bail Reform. Cohen’s d is the appropriate effect 
size measure for the comparison, suggesting that (d = 0.2) be considered a small effect size to (d 
= 0.8) be considered a large effect size between two means. Cohen's d effect size measured the 
differences between the means of QOL misdemeanor complaints before and after the passage of 
the 2019 NYS Bail Reform and was estimated at (d = 1.317), which is a large effect. Since the 
sample size before and after the 2019 Bail Reform was different, Hedhes’ g correction was 
estimated at (g = 1.308), which is a large effect. These results indicate that the passage of the 





 This study is based on NYPD data on misdemeanor offenses in NYC. The purpose of this 
research was to objectively determine whether the total number of QOL misdemeanor 
complaints in New York City increased after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform Act promulgation. 
While there were supporters of the Bail Reform, the prevalent public beliefs were that reform 
exposes communities, victims, and witnesses to dangerous interferences, allows for more QOL 
misdemeanor crimes and that offenders released back to the neighborhoods would commit 
additional “major crimes” (Parascandola & Greene, 2020). 
 The New York State’s drive to reduce pretrial detention and reshape the cash bail system 
was achieved by passing progressive reforms as part of the NYS Fiscal Year (SFY) Budget for 
2019–2020. The 2019 NYS Bail Reform Act, which limited cash bail and pretrial detention, 
intended to provide fundamental fairness for criminally accused but innocent until proven guilty 
individuals. New York judges were required to ensure almost all misdemeanor offenders' 
appearance at their trial and release them before the trial back into communities without bail. 
This study is important given the polarized views on bail reform and public safety 
concerns, as well as the scarce of literature specific to the 2019 NYS Bail Reform, let alone QOL 
offenses and QOL policing in NYC. Recent high profile pretrial releases in NYC of (1) Tiffany 
Harris, who assaulted a Jewish woman in Brooklyn, and (2) Charles Barry, who scammed a 
foreign tourist in the MTA system, sparked outrage, plunging the NYS policymakers' efforts for 
pushing the NYS Bail Reform Act as a precursor for a third national movement for bail reform 
(Goldberg & Annese, 2020, para. 2; Jasper, 2020, p. 21). In April 2020, after a public outcry 
over safety concerns, certain misdemeanor offenses were added as bail-eligible charges, 
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excluding the misdemeanors of the present study (Gonzalez et al., 2019, para. 8; Lartey, 2020, 
para. 5; Rempel & Rodriguez, 2020, p.2). 
 A series of comparative statistical tests were conducted to examine whether the 2019 
NYS Bail Reform Act increased the number of misdemeanor offenses in NYC and also 
examined race. The results are largely contrary to the public’s expectations and Hypothesis 1. 
Firstly, after the implementation of the 2019 NYS Bail Reform, complaints of criminal 
possession of a controlled substance decreased by half, and complaints of criminal trespasses, 
sexual abuse, and petit larceny decreased by one-third compared to the year before the 
implementation. After the 2019 NYS Bail Reform, there was a 49.23% decrease in reported 
complaints of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree among 
offenders identified as Blacks, 46.47% among White Hispanics, 45.8% among Whites, 
respectively. Correspondingly, reported complaints of sexual abuse in the second degree saw a 
considerable decrease across Whites (51.26%), White Hispanics (29.37%), and Blacks (24.83%). 
Interestingly, there was a decrease in reported complaints on making graffiti among offenders 
identified as Whites (45.8%). However, there was an increase in reported complaints on 
offenders identified as White Hispanics (14.2%) and Blacks (6.12%). However, our analysis 
showed the overall 8.1% after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform in reported criminal mischief 
complaints in the fourth degree.  
A decrease in reported complaints of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the 
seventh degree may be attributed to the reasons such as the NYPD de-prioritizing low-level drug 
offenses, as numbers are approximately comparable among offenders' races (Daly, 2021, para.4). 
However, it is possible that the impact of COVID-19 created a shortage in the supply chain of 
illegal controlled substances in NYC, or the financial ability of users to buy decreased due to the 
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employment loss. In addition, the results of the study supported “well-established findings that 
sexual abuse is linked to drug abuse,” and Whites are more likely to be sexually abused (Clark et 
al., 2021, p.1847; El-Bassel et al., 2003, p.1398). The decrease in reported complaints on making 
graffiti may be attributed to the indefinite suspension of a graffiti-eradication program by NYC 
in 2020 due to the budget cuts or, it is also possible, building owners not reporting incidents 
(Mac Donald, 2020, para. 1).  
 Secondly, contrary to Hypothesis 2, the overall number of the nine QOL misdemeanors 
by NYC boroughs decreased in Brooklyn (19.33%) and Manhattan (21.77%) after the 2019 NYS 
Bail Reform (See Figure 3). However, the analysis of our data revealed that after the 2019 NYS 
Bail Reform, there was a 26.80% increase in Manhattan in reported complaints on criminal 
mischief, which is defined as an “intentional damage of a property of another person,” and only 
4.94% increase in Brooklyn (see Appendix A). The increase of reported complaints on criminal 
mischief in Manhattan might be attributed to the NYC protests in 2020. While the summer 2020 
protests in NYC of the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota on May 25, 2020, 
while in police custody were largely peaceful, there were instances when the marches in 
Manhattan turned dynamic and thus resulted in damage to commercial and private properties as 
well vehicles (Corona et al., 2020, para. 4; King, 2020, para. 1; AP, 2020, para. 1).  
According to the data analysis that relied on Microsoft Excel retrieved from the Armed 
Conflict and Event Data Project (ACLED) (2021), in total, 585 crowd conflicts were registered 
in all five NYC Boroughs from May 27, 2020, to December 31, 2020, including 446 peaceful 
protests, 58 protests with intervention, and 49 violent demonstrations. During this period, 
Manhattan had the highest number of crowd conflicts – 253, followed by Brooklyn – 153, 
Queens – 70, The Bronx – 43, and Staten Island – 26 (ACLED, 2021). Overall, in all 253 crowd 
35 
 
conflicts in Manhattan, there were 178 peaceful protests and 24 violent demonstrations. In 178 
peaceful protests, the biggest associated actors were the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement 
(59), Labor groups (21), the Government of the U.S. (10), and Teachers (6) (ACLED, 2021). In 
contrast, in 24 violent demonstration protests, the two main actors were the BLM movement 
groups (10) and the Police Forces of the U.S. (10) (ACLED, 2021). The ACLED (2021) data 
supports the findings of this study of a 26.80% increase in reported complaints on criminal 
mischief in Manhattan; however, further research is needed to look into additional records.  
  Thirdly, the data analysis suggested the overall decrease of the total number of nine QOL 
misdemeanor complaints in New York City after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform Act promulgation 
(18.6%). Contrary to Hypothesis 3, a significant decrease was found in the total number of the 
nine QOL misdemeanor complaints in NYC after the passage of the 2019 NYS Bail Reform. 
However, even though that this study shows misdemeanor complaints decline, it is unclear at this 
point to understand whether the decline is attributable to the 2019 NYS Bail Reform Act. A 
decrease in complaints appears to coincide with the bail reform, but the cause of this decrease 
cannot be established with this research. Nevertheless, public safety and reoffending concerns 
are important, and whether eliminating imposing cash bail for most misdemeanors is an effective 
law should be explored further. 
Limitations 
The data has a number of limitations. Firstly, not all offenses come to the attention of the 
NYPD, and not all offenses are reported to the NYPD by citizens. Common factors for citizens 
not reporting crimes include fear of not being believed, insecurity, and the possibility of getting 
into trouble. Other factors that might contribute to withholding information are personal attitudes 
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towards police in handling reports or possible implications for victims involving re-
victimization.  
The second limitation is that a significant point that originates in every before and after 
study is whether the study observes the impact of the intervention or changes that would have 
taken place with our without the intervention. Without a control or comparison group, it is 
difficult to establish the cause-and-effect relationship between the 2019 NYS Bail Reform Act 
and the number of reported misdemeanor offenses in NYC after its implementation in 2020. 
Also, the limitations of before and after studies are that they do not consider temporal changes 
that are taking place independent of the intervention, such as COVID-19 disease in 2020. During 
the COVID-19, many people started spending more time at home and less outside, either due to 
the transitioning to work-at-home or study-at-home modalities. Also, more people were staying 
at home due to loss of employment since businesses were closing completely. In addition, the 
COVID-19 profoundly changed law enforcement, jurisprudence, and corrections operations as 
they were shifting resources and adjusting priorities to maintain public safety while doing their 
best to prevent infection among officers and offenders.  
NYPD saw the loss of staffing, “with one in five officers” have being “sick at the peak of 
the outbreak” in NYC and new responsibilities to enforce social distancing rules (Chapman &Li, 
2020, para. 3). The NYC Court system, both criminal and civil, was open only for essential 
functions, with many appearances adjourned or handled by virtual court appearances (Adelstein, 
2020). Loss of manpower among correctional officers and staff in NYC jails prompted an early 
release of over 1,500 people after the number of correction officers being infected or being on 
medically restricted duty for various health reasons increased (Rosenberg, 2020). Additional 
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analysis to strengthen this study would be identifying and measuring time trends of the COVID-
19 related adjusted practices and operations priorities which are likely distorted the results. 
Policy Implications 
 The 2019 NYS Bail Reform is the continuation of a decades-long effort of New York to 
increase pretrial release safely. When discussing criminal justice policies, it is essential to 
differentiate between policies that reduce the actual level of crime and policies that maintain the 
level of crime. An increase in property damage inflicts direct costs to the owner-victim and 
indirect costs to society at large. Preventing the increase of criminal mischief complaints or 
intentional damaging and destruction of property will assist NYC policies in regulating 
homeowner’s insurance inflation as crime rates directly affect how much owners might have to 
pay each month for insurance.  Also, secondary impacts of crime have more significant 
economic effects that can manifest after a crime. Residents might avoid dangerous 
neighborhoods, spend less time in recreational zones and streets of the community, or relocate 
elsewhere. Surveillance systems have been shown to reduce crime opportunities. For example, 
the findings of this study of the increase of the reported criminal mischiefs can assist NYC 
Boroughs in implementing a city network of additional monitoring tools and increase foot patrol. 
NYPD should continue using computer programs to predict crime hotspots and identify 
individuals who are likely to reoffend; however, the ethics of the data use should be of high 
consideration. 
Directions for Future Research 
 Future research should examine the 2019 Bail Reform over a longer period of time and 
throughout different NYC and NYPD administrations. Since this study looked into the number of 
misdemeanor complaints in NYC after the 2019 NYS Bail Reform Act, it will be interesting to 
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see if the conclusions of this study are supported by the number of misdemeanor offenses in 
other towns and counties across New York State. This will provide better insight into whether 
eliminating cash bail for most misdemeanors is a viable criminal justice solution to pretrial 
detention. One of the important future research considerations is whether eliminating cash bail 
for misdemeanor offenses is correlated with violent crime. Any finding that an increase in 
misdemeanor offenses is linked to increased violent crimes lends support for the BWT.  
Future research should examine the numbers of repeat offenders on pretrial release after 
the Bail Reform implementation that commits new offenses. This analysis will provide more 
insights into whether releasing people without bail is related to a higher incidence of repeat 
offending and whether more prolonged pretrial release correlates with committing new crimes, 
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harassment in the 
second degree 
240.30  639 A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in 
the second degree when: 
1. With intent to harass another person, the actor 
communicates, anonymously or otherwise, by 
telephone, by computer or  any other electronic 
means, or by mail, or by transmitting or 
delivering any other form of communication, a 
threat to cause physical harm to, or unlawful 
harm to the property of, such person, or a member 
of such person’s same family or household; or  
(b)  causes  a communication to be initiated 
anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, by 
computer or any other electronic means, or by 
mail, or by transmitting or delivering any other 
form of communication, a threat   to cause 
physical harm to, or unlawful harm to  the  
property of, such  person, a member of such 
person’s same family or household as defined in  
subdivision one of section 530.11 of the criminal 
procedure law, and the  actor knows or 
reasonably should know that such communication 
will cause   such  person to reasonably fear harm 
to such person’s physical safety or  property, or to 
the physical safety or property  of  a   member  of  
such person’s same family or household; or 
2. With intent to harass or threaten  another 
person, he or she makes a   telephone call, 
whether or not a conversation ensues, with no 
purpose of legitimate communication; or 
3. With the intent to harass, annoy, threaten, or 
alarm another person, he or she strikes, shoves, 
kicks, or otherwise subjects another person   to 
physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do 
the same because of a belief or perception 
regarding such person’s race, color,  national   
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origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious 
practice, age, disability, or sexual orientation, 
regardless of whether the belief or perception is 
correct; or 
4. With the intent to harass, annoy, threaten or 
alarm another person, he or she strikes, shoves, 
kicks, or otherwise subjects another person to   
physical contact, thereby causing physical injury 
to such person or to a family or household 
member of such person as defined in section 
530.11 of the criminal procedure law; or 
5. He or she commits the crime of harassment in 
the first degree and has previously been convicted 
of the crime of harassment in the first degree as 
defined by section 240.25 of this article within 
the preceding ten years. 
 
Assault in the 
third degree 
 
120.00 101 A person is guilty of assault in the third degree 
when: 
1. With intent to cause physical injury to another 
person, he causes such injury to such person or to 
a third person; or 
2. He recklessly causes physical injury to another 
person; or 
3. With criminal negligence, he causes physical 
injury to another person by means of a deadly 
weapon or a dangerous instrument. 
 
Criminal 
possession of a 
controlled 
substance in the 
seventh degree 
220.03 511 A person is guilty of criminal possession of a 
controlled substance in   the seventh  degree when 
he or she knowingly and unlawfully  possesses a  
controlled  substance;  provided, however,  that  it  
shall  not be a violation of this section when a 
person possesses a residual amount of a 
controlled substance and that residual amount is 
in or on a hypodermic  syringe  or hypodermic 
needle obtained and possessed pursuant to section  
thirty-three hundred eighty-one of the public 
health law, which includes  the state’s syringe 
exchange and  pharmacy and  medical  provider-
based  expanded  syringe access  programs; nor 
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shall it be a violation of this  section when a 
person’s unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance is  discovered as a result of seeking 
immediate health care  as  defined  in  paragraph  
(b)  of subdivision three of section 220.78 of the 
penal law,  for either another person or him  or  
herself  because  such  person  is  experiencing  a  
drug  or  alcohol  overdose  or  other life-
threatening  medical emergency as defined in 
paragraph (a) of  subdivision  three  of  section 
220.78 of the penal law. 
 
Criminal trespass 
in the second 
degree 
140.15 205 A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the 
second degree when: 
1. he or she knowingly enters or remains 
unlawfully in a dwelling; or 
2. being a person required to maintain registration 
under article six-C of the correction law and 
designated a level two or level three offender 
pursuant to subdivision six of section one 
hundred sixty-eight-l of the correction law, he or 
she enters or remains in a public or private 
elementary,  parochial,  intermediate, junior high, 
vocational or high school knowing that the victim 
of the offense for which such registration is 
required attends or formerly attended such school. 
It shall not be an offense subject to prosecution 
under this subdivision if: the person is a lawfully 
registered student at such school; the person is a 
lawful student participant in a school-sponsored 
event; the person is a  parent or a legal guardian 
of a lawfully registered student at such school and 
enters the school for the purpose of attending 
their child’s or dependent’s event or activity; such 
school is the person’s designated polling place, 
and he or she enters such school building for the 
limited purpose of voting; or if the person enters 
such school building for the limited purposes 
authorized by the superintendent or chief 
administrator of such school. 
 
Making graffiti  146.60 258 1. For purposes of this section, the term “graffiti” 
shall mean the etching, painting, covering, 
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drawing upon, or otherwise placing of a mark 
upon public or private property with intent to 
damage such property. 
2. No person shall make graffiti of any type on 
any building, public or private, or any other 
property real or personal owned by any person, 
firm or corporation, or any public agency or 
instrumentality, without the express permission of 
the owner or operator of said property. 
 
Menacing in the 
second degree 
120.14 113 A person is guilty of menacing in the second 
degree when: 
1. He or she intentionally places or  attempts to 
place another person in reasonable fear of 
physical injury, serious physical injury, or death 
by displaying a deadly weapon, dangerous 
instrument, or what appears to be a pistol, 
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other 
firearm; or 
2. He or she repeatedly follows a person or 
engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly 
commits acts over a period of time intentionally 
placing or attempting to place another person in 
reasonable fear of physical injury, serious 
physical injury or death; or 
3. He or she commits the crime of menacing in 
the third degree in violation of that part of a duly 
served order of protection or such order which the 
defendant has actual knowledge of because he or 
she was present in court when such order was 
issued, pursuant to article eight of the family 
court act, section 530.12 of the criminal 
procedure law, or an order of protection issued by 
a court of competent jurisdiction in another state, 
territorial or tribal jurisdiction, which directed the 
respondent or defendant to stay away from the 
person or persons on whose behalf the order was 
issued. 
Criminal mischief 
in the fourth 
degree 
145.00 259 A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the 
fourth degree when, having no right to do so nor 
any reasonable ground to believe that he or she 





1. Intentionally damages property of  another 
person; or  
2. Intentionally participates in the destruction of 
an abandoned building as defined in section one 
thousand nine hundred seventy-one-a of the real 
property actions and proceedings law; or 
3. Recklessly damages property of another person 
in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars; 
or 
4. With intent to prevent a person from 
communicating a request for emergency 
assistance, intentionally disables or removes 
telephonic, TTY, or similar communication 
sending equipment while that person: (a) is 
attempting to seek or is engaged in the process of 
seeking emergency assistance from  police, law 
enforcement, fire or emergency medical services 
personnel; or (b) is attempting to seek or is 
engaged in the process of seeking emergency 
assistance from another person or entity in order 
to protect himself, herself or a third person from 
imminent physical injury. The fact that the 
defendant has an ownership interest in such 
equipment shall not be a defense to a charge 
pursuant to this subdivision. 
 
Petit larceny 
(from open area) 
155.25 339 A person is guilty of petit larceny when he steals 
property. 
Sexual abuse in 
the second degree 
130.60 175 A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the second 
degree when he or she subjects  another 
person to sexual contact and when  such other 
person is: 
1. Incapable of consent by reason of some factor 
other than being less than seventeen  years old; or 
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NYC Borough  NYPD Precincts 
 
Bronx Borough (=1) 
 
40th Precinct, 41st Precinct, 42nd Precinct, 43rd Precinct, 44th 
Precinct, 45th Precinct, 46th Precinct, 47th Precinct, 48th Precinct, 
49th Precinct, 50th Precinct, 52nd Precinct.   
Brooklyn Borough (=2) 60th Precinct, 61st Precinct, 62nd Precinct, 63rd Precinct, 66th 
Precinct, 67th Precinct, 68th Precinct, 69th Precinct, 70th Precinct, 
71st Precinct, 72nd Precinct, 76th Precinct, 78th Precinct, 73rd 
Precinct, 75th Precinct, 77th Precinct, 79th Precinct, 81st Precinct, 
83rd Precinct, 84th Precinct, 88th Precinct, 90th Precinct, 94th 
Precinct.  
Manhattan Borough (=3) 1st Precinct, 5th Precinct, 6th Precinct, 7th Precinct, 9th Precinct, 
10th Precinct, 13th Precinct, Midtown South (14th) Precinct, 17th 
Precinct, Midtown North (18th) Precinct, 19th Precinct, 20th 
Precinct, Central Park (22nd) Precinct, 23rd Precinct, 24th 
Precinct, 25th Precinct, 26th Precinct, 28th Precinct, 30th Precinct, 
32nd Precinct,   33rd Precinct, 34th Precinct.  
Queens Borough (=4) 100th Precinct, 101st Precinct, 102nd Precinct, 103rd Precinct, 
105th Precinct, 106th Precinct, 107th Precinct, 113th Precinct, 
104th Precinct, 108th Precinct, 109th Precinct, 110th Precinct, 
111th Precinct, 112th Precinct, 114th Precinct, 115th Precinct. 
 
Staten Island Borough (=5)  120th Precinct, 121st Precinct, 122nd Precinct, and 123rd Precinct.  
